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At War with water: The Maoist state and the 1954 Yangzi floods* 
Chris Courtney 
Asia Research Institute 
National University of Singapore 
Singapore 
arichc@nus.edu.sg 
Abstract 
This article offers a critical reappraisal of the Maoist state’s response to the 1954 Yangzi Floods. It 
uses a variety of sources, including previously classified government reports and oral history testimony 
to challenge the official narrative. It argues that far from being a remarkable victory for the new 
government, the flood was a humanitarian catastrophe that caused almost 150,000 deaths. Government 
hydraulic policies were partly to blame, as the vast majority of disaster victims were located in rural 
areas that were flooded deliberately in order to protect cities. In addition to revealing the true scale of 
the flood, this article uses the disaster as a prism to examine the early Maoist state. The government’s 
combative environmental policies turned disaster governance into a war on water. This approach had 
certain benefits, particularly in terms of organising an effective urban relief campaign. Unfortunately, 
campaign politics fostered an atmosphere of distrust, which encouraged many citizens to resist disaster 
prevention policies. The example of the 1954 flood reveals the profound impact that a political context 
can have upon the outcome of a supposedly natural disaster 
 
* A version of this article was presented at the Asia Research Institute of the National University of 
Singapore. I am indebted to the seminar participants for their insightful comments. Fiona Williamson 
offered helpful suggestions, as did the anonymous reviewers for Modern Asian Studies. The British 
Inter-University China Centre provided financial support for the initial research for this article. The 
project also benefited from the financial support of a Singapore Ministry of Education Academic 
Research Fund Tier 2 grant entitled ‘Governing Compound Disasters in Urbanising Asia’ (MOE2014-
T2-1-017). In spite of considerable effort, regrettably I have not been able to determine who holds the 
copyright for the cartoon reproduced below as Figure 2. It is published here with a citation to the 
original source. This article would not have been possible were it not for the generosity of my 
interviewees and the many other residents of Hubei who have been kind enough to share their 
memories of flooding with me over the past few years. 
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At War with Water: The Maoist State and the 1954 Yangzi floods 
On the banks of the Yangzi River in the central Chinese city of Wuhan the face of 
Mao Zedong stares down from a large stone obelisk. A casual observer might be 
forgiven for assuming that this image adorns some kind of war memorial. In fact, this 
imposing architectural feature commemorates a great flood that swept down the 
Yangzi in 1954. Yet this is not a sombre monument but instead a celebration of a 
triumphant human victory over nature. Embossed reliefs depict heroic figures doing 
battle with torrents of water, clutching farm tools, shoulder poles, and political 
paraphernalia such as flags and banners. Figure 1 shows one such relief, in which a 
worker holds a slogan that reads ‘Quotations of Chairman Mao: Be resolute and do 
not fear sacrifices, surmount every difficulty in order to win victory.’1 Erected at the 
height of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, this monument produces an unambiguous 
image of a commanding state. Scholars today tend to be suspicious of propaganda 
produced during this period, given the extent to which the state monopolised all forms 
of representation. Surprisingly, however, no historian has yet challenged the 
triumphal narrative depicted upon this monument. 
 
 
Figure 1 
    This article offers a critical reappraisal of the Maoist state’s response to the 1954 
Yangzi Floods. It focuses upon Hubei province, the epicentre of the disaster. Building 
upon the methodology developed by scholars such as Ralph Thaxton and Jeremy 
Brown, it utilises a combination of textual and oral sources. 2  Contemporary 
newspapers and official publications yield little reliable information, yet offer a 
critical insight into the operations and mentality of state, revealing how governors 
wanted the crisis to be understood. Internal cadre reports and disaster investigations 
conducted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) provide a far greater insight into 
the reality on the ground, albeit one still steeped in politicised rhetoric. 3  Oral 
histories, in the form of fifteen interviews conducted with flood survivors, help to 
unpick the stiches of the official narrative.4 The memories of Hubei residents have, of 
course, been eroded by time and shaped by the exigencies of half a century of life 	
1 Photograph by the author. 
2 Ralph Thaxton, Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China: Mao's Great Leap Forward Famine 
and the Origins of Righteous Resistance in Da Fo Village, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2008. Jeremy Brown, City Versus Countryside in Mao's China: Negotiating the Divide, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2012. 
3 Some original cadre reports have been published in an archival collection. Hubei sheng yijiuwusi 
nian fangxun kanghong dang'an xuanbian, Hubei sheng dang'an guan, Wuhan, 1998, pp. 225-27. 
(Hereafter refered to as HFKDX). Others reports were located in the Hubei Provincial Archives. 
4 The author conducted oral history interviews in Hubei between 2009-2010 and 2013. 
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experiences. Imperfect as they may be, the voices of former refugees still offer a vital 
corrective to otherwise mono-vocal state discourse.  
 
    The picture that emerges from these sources differs profoundly from that offered by 
previous histories.5 Far from being a victory over nature, the 1954 flood precipitated a 
humanitarian catastrophe - possibly the most lethal inundation suffered anywhere on 
earth during the latter half of the twentieth century.6 Almost 150,000 people were 
killed in Hubei alone. Most casualties were concentrated in rural areas that the 
government flooded deliberately in order to protect urban industries. Contrary to 
contemporary reports, this strategy was not wholly successful, as large swathes of 
Wuhan were flooded, causing twenty thousand people to become refugees.  
 
    What can the 1954 flood teach us about the Maoist state? Anthony Oliver-Smith 
has argued that disasters often act as crise revelatrice. When they strike, ‘the 
fundamental features of society and culture are laid bare in stark relief by the 
reduction of priorities to basic social, cultural, and material necessities.’7 The flood 
revealed much about the political and economic imperatives governing life under the 
early Maoist state. One of the most pressing of these was the desire to eradicate all 
enemies - even if these happened to be environmental. Flood prevention was 
represented as a war against water, in which the state would marshal its great human 
resources to conquer a disaster. Given that the CCP had known little but war over the 
past few decades, it is perhaps unsurprising that governors treated the flood as yet 
another foe to be vanquished. The weapons governors chose were a series of sluice 
gates that released water from the Yangzi onto the plains. Unfortunately, very little 
thought was given to the humanitarian consequences of this hydraulic intervention. 
The results were catastrophic, as sluice gates were opened onto still inhabited areas. 
 
    The 1954 flood was not simply a technical failure. It was a disaster incubated by 
politics. With few exceptions, historians studying Maoist disaster governance have 
focussed upon the famine of the late 1950s. This is not without justification, as it was 
one of the worst catastrophes in history. Recently, Lauri Paltemaa has taken a more 
comprehensive view, examining how the state coped with a series of disasters 
affecting the city of Tianjin throughout the Maoist period. He does not deny the 
horror of the famine, and the key role that the state played in its genesis. Yet Paltemaa 
also observes that during other crises, the state responded relatively effectively. The 
organised labour force and the command economy facilitated efficient and expedient 
relief.8 Although this article highlights a hidden tragedy at the heart of disaster 
governance, it concurs with Paltemaa in recognising that, in certain respects, the 
Maoist state responded effectively to the 1954 flood. 
 
	
5 The flood features in local gazetteers and histories such as Pi Mingxiu, Wuhan tongshi: Zhonghua 
Remin Gongheguo [shang], Wuhan chubanshe, Wuhan, 2006, p. 70. It has also been subject to 
articles such as Li Qin, '1954 nian Hubei shuizai yu jiuji 1954' Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu, 10, 
2003. There are also a number personalised accounts, such as Yao Ting and Yu Chun. ‘30 wan ren 
75 tian dazao jianguochu zui da shuili gongcheng’ Wenshi bolan, August, 2009.  
6 The 1959 China floods apparently caused 200,000 deaths, yet this mortality is closely connected 
with the anthropogenic famine of that year. On global flood mortality see EM-DAT, 19 July 2016, 
http://www.emdat.be/disaster_profiles/index.html accessed 06.09.2016 
7 Anthony Oliver-Smith, 'Anthropological Research on Hazards and Disaster,’ Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 25, October, 1996, 303-28. 
8  Lauri Paltemaa, Managing Famine, Flood, and Earthquake in China: Tianjin, 1958-1985, 
Routledge, New York, 2016. 
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    At the same time, the draconian and often repressive policies enacted during the 
early 1950s fostered a caustic political environment, which led many citizens to 
distrust state representatives. This seriously inhibited disaster governance. 
Propagandists attempted to generate compliance by projecting an image of control 
and encouraging self-sacrifice. On occasions this seemed to work. Some citizens 
appeared to embrace an ethos of voluntarism, if only as a somewhat instrumental 
performance of regime compliance. Elsewhere, communities actively resisted disaster 
governance, believing that the CCP was using evacuation to dupe them into forced 
collectivisation. Ultimately, the 1954 flood revealed both the best and worst elements 
of CCP rule. The same structures of control that facilitated rapid mobilisation and the 
distribution of resources also generated a sense of distrust and insecurity that was not 
conducive to an effective disaster prevention campaign.  
 
Taking over Hubei 
 
In April 1949 a ragtag armada began to cross the Yangzi. Tens of thousands of 
soldiers packed onto boats, clung onto bales of straw, or drifted on inflated pigskins. 
These were the advanced troops of the People’s Liberation Army, which had amassed 
2,000,000 strong on the northern banks of the river, awaiting the final push south to 
secure CCP victory.9 Having taken the erstwhile capital of Nanjing, one of the three 
divisions moved west. On 15th May it entered Wuhan, the political and economic 
capital of the middle Yangzi region. Five days later a guerrilla veteran named Li 
Xiannian, the son of a local carpenter, was appointed as Party Secretary of Hubei.10 
As he set about pacifying the province, his forces were confronted not only by 
military resistance but also by unruly rivers. In 1949 Hubei experienced the worst 
floods since the catastrophic deluge of 1935. Soon the dykes of the Yangzi and Han 
Rivers had begun to collapse.11 The inundation slowed the advancing army, which did 
not complete its take-over of Hubei until November 1949.12 The rule of the CCP had 
been baptised in floodwater. Over the next few years, the regime would seek to use 
hydraulic engineering to control the capricious rivers that had delayed their victory.  
 
    The water control policies of the early Maoist state formed part of a broader 
portfolio of reforms, which were designed to consolidate political hegemony and 
reconfigure the economy. The government initially adopted somewhat conciliatory 
policies towards merchants and industrialists in urban areas such as Wuhan, limiting 
their activities to imposing a more disciplined system of taxation. No doubt many 
businesspeople longed for the days when duties could be evaded by a discreet 
payment to a corrupt Nationalist official.13 Yet it was not until 1952, with the so-
called Five-Antis (Wufan) campaign, that the assault upon commerce began in earnest. 
By eroding the power of traditional elites, and organising urban citizens through the 
system of work units (danwei), the CCP hoped to replace the commercial economy 
	
9 Odd Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 2003, pp. 241-4 
10 Hubei shengzhi: dashi ji, Hubei renmin chubanshe, Wuhan, 1990, p557. Westad, Decisive 
Encounters, p. 47. 
11 Hubei shengzhi: dashiji p. 565. This was the second successive year of flooding. Forty-three 
counties suffered inundation in 1948. Hubei shengzhi: minzheng, Hubei renmin chubanshe, Wuhan, 
1990, pp. 113-114 
12 Westad, Decisive Encounters p. 284. Hubei Shengzhi: dashi ji, p. 566. 
13 Wang Shaoguang, 'The Construction of State Extractive Capacity: Wuhan, 1949-1953', Modern 
China, 27, April, 2001, pp. 229-261. 
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with state-owned enterprises.14 This new configuration of the urban economy would 
have a profound influence upon the outcome of the 1954 flood. Hydraulic engineers 
would be called upon to protect state-owned industries at any cost, even if this 
involved sacrificing the countryside. 
 
    Profound as the changes to urban life were, they paled in comparison to the seismic 
shifts occurring in rural Hubei. Between 1950-1952 the countryside underwent a 
policy of radical land reform. Local cadres categorised families according to an 
inflexible class taxonomy. Those deemed landlords (dizhu) or rich peasants (funong) 
not only lost land and property, but were also subjected to violent persecution and 
even execution. Meanwhile, the army undertook a series of pacification campaigns to 
obliterate the last vestiges of resistance. 15  Land reform proved highly popular 
amongst its beneficiaries. Before long, however, it became clear that this great 
redistribution was not all that it appeared. Rural communities were subjected to highly 
extractive requisitioning policies. The state grain monopoly, which was introduced in 
1953, compelled farmers to sell their surplus to the local government at a fixed price. 
This was followed in the spring of 1954 with a nationwide drive to subsume 
individual households within larger agricultural cooperatives. The presumed 
efficiency savings offered by these policies were to form the economic foundations of 
state-led industrialisation.16 The countryside was to provide the economic fuel to 
power the engine of urban industrial growth.  
 
    It is tempting to posit a clear line of evolution between these early rural policies 
and the famine that raged during the Great Leap Forward of 1958-1961. Unrestricted 
grain requisitioning and the creation of People’s Communes – which were 
cooperatives mutated to gargantuan proportions – would eventually drive tens of 
millions to their graves. Yet it is important not to submit to an overly teleological 
narrative. Hayekian scholars such as Frank Dikötter and Yang Jisheng have argued 
that early collectivization set China off along the ‘road to serfdom,’ creating a 
politico-economic dynamic that would inevitably lead to disaster.17 Dikötter has 
argued that the state grain monopoly resulted in food shortages in many areas, 
including Wuhan, as early as 1954. 18 Within his analysis there is no mention of the 
flood, which caused one of the worst weather-induced production shortfalls of the 
twentieth century.19 Whilst by no means denying the detrimental effects of Maoist 
economic policies – particularly the millions killed by famine - historians such Li 
Huaiyin and Y.Y. Kueh have noted that collectivisation had numerous beneficial 
effects, including considerable infrastructural and health care developments.20 Since 	
14 Mark Frazier, The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace: State, Revolution, and Labor 
Management, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p.132. 
15 Hubei shengzhi: dashi ji  pp. 575, 569, 590-1 
16 Li Huaiyin, Village China Under Socialism and Reform: A Micro-Hisotry, 1948-2008, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2009, pp. 30-1 
17 This is a title of a chapter in Frank Dikötter, The Tragedy of Liberation : A History of the Chinese 
Revolution, 1945-1957, Bloomsbury Press, New York, 2013. Elsewhere he has argued that the 
Great Leap Famine ‘stands as a reminder of how profoundly misplaced is the idea of state 
planning.’ Frank Dikötter, Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating 
Catastrophe, 1958- 62, Bloomsbury Publishing,  New York, 2010, p. xii. Yang invokes Hayek 
explicitly to explain Maoist society, see Yang Jisheng, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 
1958-1962, trans. by Stacy Mosher and Jian Guo, Allen Lane, London, 2012, Chapter 14. 
18 Dikötter, Tragedy of Liberation, p. 224. 
19 On comparison of agricultural losses caused by disasters see Y. Y. Kueh, Agricultural Instability 
in China, 1931-1990: Weather, Technology, and Institutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1995. 
20 Ibid. Li, Village China. 
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the 1950s there has been a measurable improvement in Chinese life expectancy. 
Whether this was because of or in spite of collectivisation remains a matter of 
debate21  
 
    The 1954 flood highlighted both the benefits and detriments of early Maoist 
governance. Collectivisation offered what Kueh has described as an ‘institutional 
hedge’ against the effects of climatic disasters. Work units facilitated the rapid 
deployment of flood prevention labourers and the state-controlled grain market 
enabled more efficient relief distribution. At the same time, however, revolutionary 
politics inhibited disaster governance by engendering a sense of insecurity. Those 
who had benefitted from land reform guarded their new property fiercely, whilst those 
who had suffered feared a further erosion of their livelihoods. Trust was diminished 
further by rapacious extraction of grain. The insecure atmosphere in rural Hubei made 
disaster governance far more difficult.  
 
Taming the Yangzi 
 
In 1952 the journalist Di Lei offered a typically ideological interpretation of Hubei’s 
historic water control problems. The cause of the disastrous floods that had long 
blighted the lives of the local population, it was argued, was class prejudice.22 As 
Imperial and Republican administrators did not suffer personally during inundations, 
they were not invested in finding a solution to the root causes of hydraulic failures, 
being content merely to alleviate the symptoms of flooding. This politicised reading 
of history ignored the numerous elite figures, such as the late Qing polymath Wei 
Yuan, who had argued vehemently for systemic reform of the hydraulic network.23 
More importantly, this crude caricature posited human agency as the sole variable 
determining disaster causality. In reality, flood disasters were both environmental and 
anthropogenic. Humans had exacerbated natural risks by converting floodplains into 
arable land. The dykes they constructed to ameliorate the resultant inundations, over 
time exacerbated flood risk, particularly when poorly maintained. The deluges that 
occurred when hydraulic networks failed were more dangerous than natural floods. 
The most lethal occurred when the Great Jingjiang Embankment running parallel to 
the Yangzi collapsed, releasing the river onto its plains. From the nineteenth century, 
the intensity and frequency of flooding increased dramatically.24 The most lethal 
inundation occurred in 1931, when a nationwide disaster killed in excess of 2,000,000 
people.25 
 
    In February 1951 the government commissioned the Yangzi Conservancy 
Authority (Changjiang shuili weiyuanhui) to solve the problem of flooding in Hubei. 	
21 For Dikötter’s probably excessive estimate of 45,000,000 famine fatalities to be true, the CCP 
would have had to have reduced the crude death rate from 25 to 10 per thousand during the 1950s, 
an achievement that would have saved more lives than those who died in the famine. See Cormac Ó 
Gráda, 'Great Leap into Famine: A Review Essay', Population and Development Review, March 
2011, p. 191–210. 
22 Di Lei, 'Xin Zhongguo weida de jianshe shiye-Jingjiang fenhong gongcheng,’ Luxing zazhi, 26, 
1952, pp. 25-30. 
23 Wei Yuan, 'Hubei difang yi,’ in Wei Yuan quan ji, Vol 12, Yuelu shushe, Changsha, 2004 [Qing], 
pp. 368-69. 
24 Zhang Jiayan, Coping with Calamity: Environmental Change and Peasant Response in Central 
China, 1736-1949, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2014. 
25 Chris Courtney, 'Governing Disasters: A Comparative Analysis of the 1931, 1954 and 1998 
Middle-Yangzi Floods', in 100 Years After the Xinhai Revolution: Domestic Change, Challenges 
and Continuities, Kun-Chin Lin and Jean-Marc Blanchard (eds.), Palgrave, London, 2016. 
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Chinese engineers, aided by Soviet advisors, designed a series of flood diversion 
areas (fenhong qu) near the cities of Jiangling and Shashi in Jingzhou prefecture, 
central Hubei. Sluice gates would divert the Yangzi onto the plains when floods 
threatened. This area would then be drained through another series of sluice gates 
when water levels had decreased.26 This scheme met with the highest approval. Mao 
Zedong himself proclaimed: ‘For the great benefit of the people, be victorious in the 
construction of the flood diversion.’27 The project utilised the full strength of CCP 
mass mobilisation. 300,000 labourers completed construction in just seventy-five days 
in the spring of 1952.28 Conditions were tough, with labourers being forced to work, 
eat, and sleep in a damp environment plagued by malarial mosquitoes.29  
 
    The flood diversion project coincided with the nationwide Three Antis (Sanfan) 
campaign, during which the CCP sought to eliminate corruption, waste, and 
bureaucracy. Workers were forced to spend their resting hours undergoing no doubt 
tedious meetings and self-evaluations. The politicisation of the project escalated 
during the subsequent Five Antis campaign.  A local supplier named Wu Xingce was 
accused of being an ‘evil merchant’ (jianshang), for supposedly provided substandard 
construction materials.30 Skimming off hydraulic projects had been fairly common in 
Republican era. Hubei was littered with jerrybuilt dykes as a result.31 It is impossible 
to determine whether Wu was genuinely guilty of this offence, or whether the CCP 
made an example of him in order to undermine the power of commercial elites. This 
episode demonstrated the extent to which all aspects of life had become politicised, 
and, for some, intensely precarious. 
 
    Whilst workers and merchants suffered, it was the rural majority who bore the 
brunt of the flood diversion project. Those living in areas designated for inundation 
were to be relocated to one of ten specially designated safety areas (anquan qu). By 
March 1952, over 60,500 people had been resettled. Others were reluctant to abandon 
their ancestral homes, even when offered incentives such as money, food, and 
tractors.32 Compulsory relocations have been a perennial feature of CCP hydraulic 
governance. The anthropologist Jun Jing revealed the deep trauma suffered by one 
community dislocated from its proud heritage by the construction of a dam.33 The 
history of the forced evacuation of Hubei’s flood diversion area has yet to be written. 
Clearly it was not entirely successful. Many people continued to live in now acutely 
vulnerable areas. This was to have tragic consequences when the sluice gates were 
opened in 1954. 
 
    Any description of a monumental water control project cannot help but evoke the 
spectre of Karl Wittfogel. This historian characterised imperial China as one of a 
number of ‘hydraulic societies,’ in which the imperative to prevent floods or irrigate 
arid landscapes helped to foster a highly centralised mode of governance. He 
described this as ‘oriental despotism.’34  The vast archive pertaining to this history of 	
26 Di, 'Xin Zhongguo.’ 
27 Hubei shengzhi: dashi ji, pp. 599-601. 
28 'Qishiwu tian wanchengle weida de Jingjiang fenhong gongcheng, Qianjin, 262, 1952. 
29 Yao and Yu. ‘30 wan ren’. 
30 Di, 'Xin Zhongguo.’ 
31 Zhang, Coping with Calamity. 
32 Di, 'Xin Zhongguo.’ 
33 Jun Jing, The Temple of Memories: History, Power, and Morality in a Chinese Village, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1996. 
34 Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1957, p. 47 
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water control in China has proven Wittfogel largely wrong, at least for the late 
imperial period. Hydraulic governance was typically highly localised, with the central 
state preferring delegation to megalomaniacal control.35 Ironically, at the same time 
that Wittfogel was penning his most famous exposition of oriental despotism, the 
Maoist state was beginning to exert unprecedented control over the hydraulic network. 
In the decades to come, the CCP would reshape the hydrosphere more profoundly 
than any polity in history. It might be tempting, then, to turn Wittfogel on his head, 
suggesting that it was not until the state achieved despotic power that it was able to 
create a fully hydraulic society. Yet even at is most commanding, the CCP state never 
enjoyed the kind of power that Wittfogel envisioned. The 1954 flood demonstrated 
that the government could control neither rivers nor people completely. 
 
At war with water 
 
It started raining in the spring of 1954 and did not stop for fifty-eight days.36 Soon, 
around 1,500,000 people in Hubei had fallen victim to mountain flooding (shanhong), 
as great surges of water and debris swept along the tributaries that drained the 
highlands. Those not drowned found their fields covered in sandy deposits, leaving 
them uncultivable. On the plains below some 2,250,000 people suffered less dramatic 
yet no less devastating waterlogging disasters (zizai). They spent the spring struggling 
to drain their fields, as the rain poured down unremittingly. Having lost their summer 
crops, many were prevented from planting a winter insurance harvest. The worst was 
yet to come. A series of storms struck in July, causing local dykes throughout Hubei 
to suffer breaches (kuikou). 37 Around 3,780,000 people were inundated as river water 
was funnelled through the artificial topography onto their homes. One former farmer 
recalled in an interview how she was carrying manure to the fields when she heard 
people crying and shouting. ‘I turned around to see a huge wave. It was really white, 
like a sheet.’ Another described how his family had scrambled to their boat in order to 
flee to a local hillside. Many were not so fortunate. Thousands were drowned or 
buried alive by the cascade. By the summer of 1954, more than 10,000,000 people – 
nearly two fifths of Hubei - were under water.38  
 
    The engineers tasked with maintaining the hydraulic system now sought 
desperately to prevent further destruction. Their Republican predecessors had been 
fond of quoting water control treatises by classical theorists such as such Mencius.39 
In 1954, chief engineer Tao Shuzeng chose instead to quote the military theorist Sun 
Zi, enjoining his fellow engineers to ‘know themselves and their enemies (zhiji zhibi)’ 
so that they might win their ‘battle (zhandou)’ with rivers.40 Judith Shapiro has argued 
that such highly combative rhetoric reflected the ultra-utilitarian environmental 
attitude of the Maoist state. Yet if the language of conflict was particularly prevalent 
in CCP rhetoric, this had as much to do with decades of warfare as it did with 	
35 Pierre-Étienne Will, 'State Intervention in the Administration of a Hydraulic Infrastructure: The 
Example of Hubei Province in Late Imperial Times', in The Scope of State Power in China, Stuart 
R. Schram (ed.), Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1985. Peter C. Perdue, Exhausting the 
Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan, 1500-1850, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1987. 
36 Zong Yongqiang and Chen Xiqing, 'The 1998 Flood on the Yangtze, China', Natural Hazards, 
22, 2, September, 2000, pp. 165–184. 
37 'Hubei sheng zaiqing jiankuang, September 6th 1954,' HFKDX, pp. 225-27.  
38 Estimates vary somewhat. One report suggests a figure as high as 10,347,000. 'Hubei sheng 
zaiqing jiankuang’  
39 See for example ‘Kongzi dachen yu shuizai, Guowen zhoukan, 8, no. 35, 1931. 
40 Tao Dinglai, Li Senlin and Zhou Yeqing, 'Tao Shuzeng yu 1954 nian Wuhan da hongshui,’ 
Wuhan wenshi ziliao, vol. 12, 2005, pp. 20-23. 
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ideology. Pamela Crossley has observed that the cessation of hostilities in Korea in 
1953 marked the end of an unbroken chain of armed conflicts that stretched right back 
to 1926.41 With Taiwan still under Nationalist control, war remained a distinct 
possibility. Politicians saw the 1954 flood as part of this broader existential struggle. 
As the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) put it ‘the imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek 
[…] cannot fight us, and so hope that natural disasters will destroy us.’42  
 
    Chinese leaders were still war leaders - their mode of thinking combative by default. 
This influence went beyond the military allusions that peppered official discourse. It 
permeated the governance style of the CCP.43 Ralph Thaxton has noted how the 
wartime legacy begat a confrontational work style, leading cadres to make hasty and 
unilateral decisions.44 Hydraulic governors were subject to a similar urgency of 
command, adopting bold strategies with little thought for the humanitarian 
consequences. Having convinced themselves they were at war with water, they were 
determined to win regardless of the collateral damage. By the summer of 1954 they 
already lost a number of battles, and an estimated 6,660,000 mu (4,400 km²) of land 
was under water as a result.45 Yet Wuhan had yet to be flooded. In the ensuing 
months the city would become the front line, its defence determining the outcome of 
the war. The race was now on to save Wuhan. 
 
    Chinese flood prevention campaigns have always required vast amounts of labour. 
Previous political systems had extracted this through various forms of compulsion, 
most often corvée labour or work relief. Although labour was no less compulsory for 
the soldiers, work units, and rural citizens sent to the dykes in 1954, propagandists 
were determined to portray the campaign as a voluntary enterprise. Periodicals such 
as the Yangzi Daily (Changjiang Ribao) published accounts of heroic workers 
dedicating themselves to the war against water.46 These exemplars embodied a mode 
of compulsory volunteerism, which would become a defining feature of Maoist 
political culture. They displayed an unwavering dedication to labour - much like the 
Stakhanovite workers of the Soviet Union - yet also indulged a penchant for 
ostentatious acts of self-sacrifice.47 Within the evolution of the ideal Maoist subject, 
they occupied a position somewhere between the heroism of celebrated wartime 
martyrs and the trudging obedience of the most famous of exemplars Lei Feng – the 
smiling peasant/soldier/worker who was content to be an anonymous screw in the 
revolutionary machine.48 
 
    Wang Maoshan was a typical flood hero. He was reported to have worked for nine 
days without rest, spending several hours neck deep in sewage. He continued to stack 
	
41 See Pamela Crossley, The Wobbling Pivot - China Since 1800: An Interpretive History, Wiley-
Blackwell, Chichester, 2010, p. 180. 
42 Renmin Ribao 24 October 1954 
43 When the rains failed in Hubei in 1952 the party launched a ‘war against drought (fanghan 
kanghan douzheng).’ Hubei shengzhi: dashi ji, p566. Around the same time Zhou Enlai described 
diplomacy as ‘a war of words and a war of swords.’ Anne-Marie Brady, Friend of China: The Myth 
of Rewi Alley, Routledge, London, 2003, p. 71. 
44 Thaxton, Catastrophe and Contention, pp. 84-5. 
45 'Hubei sheng zaiqing jiankuang’ 
46 There are articles describing flood exemplars throughout the year, see for example Changjiang 
Ribao, 20 August 1954. 
47 Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1988.  
48 Shi Yonggang (ed.) Lei Feng 1940-1962, Sanlian shudian, Beijing, 2006. 
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sandbags even after he had developed a heart complaint.49 Such labouring masculinity 
and disregard for personal safety was not reserved solely for men. Lu Youzhi was 
pictured plunging herself into freezing water in order block a breach, using her own 
body as a weapon against water.50 In a marked contrast to Confucian norms, worker 
heroes ignored even the most sacred of personal obligations, choosing flood 
prevention over kin and home. Wang continued to work even after his wife fell ill, 
and Lu abandoned her own children to head to the dykes.51 The message was 
unequivocal - dedication to the state superseded all other considerations.    
 
    Exemplar narratives were often so outlandish that they bordered upon self-parody. 
This does not mean they did not work. A retired factory worker from Wuhan recalled 
in an interview how members of his work unit genuinely had wished to participate in 
the flood prevention campaign. Rather than being motivated by patriotic fervour or 
revolutionary zeal, however, they were keen to be seen as key ‘activists’ (jiji fenzi) 
within the work unit. Such a designation was of no little significance. Susan Shirk 
characterised Maoist China as a ‘virtuocratic’ society, in which career advancement 
was based more upon a reputation for political correctness than it was upon any form 
of occupational competence. In this respect, exemplar narratives offered a vital script 
for ordinary citizens to enact the kinds of instrumental performances that helped them 
to gain merit in the eyes of the state.52 
 
    Not everyone was dedicated to the war against water. One internal cadre report 
noted that large crowds of young men were choosing to sit around in teahouses rather 
than participating in flood prevention.53 Worse still, a local history described how 
criminal elements (bufa fenzi) were arrested for attempting to sabotage the relief 
effort in Wuhan.54 Why and how they did so is not divulged. Later, several merchants 
were executed for the crime of ‘making up rumours to cheat the masses’ (zaoyao 
huozhong), having attempted to hoard grain to inflate prices.55 The reports of these 
class enemies represented a dark inversion of exemplar narratives. Flood heroes were 
celebrated for embodying the norms promoted by the new state. Those who subverted 
these norms could expect little mercy. In this respect, the war against water formed 
part of the broader project to remould Chinese citizens. 
 
Drowning the countryside 
 
Even with a vast army of workers piling sandbags into breaches and propping-up 
dykes, the government could not stop the gigantic flood peak traveling downstream 
towards Wuhan. On 19th July governors decided to unleash their ultimate weapon, the 
newly finished Yangzi Flood Diversion. They opened the first of several sluice gates 
at a place named Yuwang Gong - or Palace of King Yu - in central Hubei.56 The 	
49 Wuhan shi fangxun zong zhihuibu, Dang lingdao renmin zhanshengle hongshui, Hubei renmin 
chubanshe, Wuhan, 1955, p. 94. 
50 Ibid. p. 95. 
51 Ibid. pp. 62-63. For similar English language exemplar narratives see Rewi Alley, Man Against 
Flood: A Story of the 1954 Flood on the Yangtse and of the Reconstruction That Followed It, New 
World Press, Peking, 1956. 
52  Susan Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1982. 
53 ‘Wuhan fangxun zhihuibu － Hanyang qu zhihuibu fangxun gongzuo zongjie baogao,’ 28 
September 1954, Hubei sheng dang’an guan, Wuhan. 
54 Pi, Wuhan tongshi, p. 70 
55 Ibid. p. 69 
56 Hubei shengzhi: Dashi ji, p. 566. 
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symbolism of this location cannot have been lost upon the local population. The 
mythic King Yu had established dynastic authority in ancient times by taming a great 
flood. 57 By opening the sluice gate, the CCP now linked its own legitimacy to 
hydraulic mastery. This initial diversion proved insufficient. Over the course of the 
next few months the sluice gates were opened on a further two occasions.58 
 
    The flood diversion was represented as a great advance in environmental 
management. In reality it was defeat masquerading as victory. The government had 
gifted the Yangzi a floodplain before it could forge its own. Just as propagandists had 
transformed the scrambled retreat of the Long March 1934-1935 into a symbol of the 
tenacity of the CCP, now they represented the inundation of thousands of mu of 
valuable agricultural land as a masterstroke of environmental management. The 
People’s Daily heaped praise upon rural communities for ‘voluntarily allowing their 
villages to be flooded, thereby sacrificing their own wellbeing in order to save the 
city.’ A farmer was quoted as saying that ‘industrial construction is the great life root 
(daming genzi) of the people, and so had to be protected.’59 The CCP were not the 
first to mobilise the rhetoric of sacrifice. Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley has described 
how the Nationalists portrayed those who were deliberately inundated by the 
breaching of the Yellow River dykes in 1938 as martyrs in the war against Japan.60 
What was novel in 1954, perhaps, was the extent to which a ventriloquist state 
depicting its own rhetoric issuing forth from the mouths of the people.      
 
    Not only had the government destroyed the homes and livelihoods of rural citizens, 
it now had the temerity to suggest that it had done so with their willing compliance. In 
reality, those living in flood diversion area had not volunteered their homes. The order 
to open the sluice gates was imposed upon them. Furthermore, beneath the highly 
politicised rhetoric of cadre reports, there were hints that something was going 
seriously wrong in the diversion zone. The government had completed an ambitious 
hydraulic project but had not prepared an adequate plan to manage the inevitable 
consequences. Now they were called upon to conduct a rapid evacuation of the 
affected zone. Unfortunately many people were extremely reluctant to leave their 
homes.  
 
    Resisting government evacuation is by no means unusual. Members of flood-
threatened communities from areas as diverse as Mozambique, India and New 
Orleans have all refused to be relocated.61 Often disparaged as ignorance, such 
behaviour is usually rooted in an understandable desire to protect property. In as 
much as this basic material concern played a role in 1954, residents of Hubei were 
also influenced by their particular political context. Villagers in Jianli County 	
57 Anne Birrell, 'The Four Flood Myth Traditions of Classical China', T'oung Pao, 83, 1997, pp. 
213-59. 
58 For a full list of the openings see Pi, Wuhan tongshi, p. 70. 
59 Renmin Ribao 24 October 1954. This exact phrase was also used in ‘Wuhan fangxun zhihuibu.’ 
60 Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley, 'Between War and Water: Farmer, City, and State in China's Yellow 
River Flood of 1938–1947', Agricultural History, 90, December, 2016, pp. 94-116. 
61 Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Dams, Displacement, and the Delusion of Development: 
Cahora Bassa and Its Legacies in Mozambique, 1965–2007, Ohio University Press, Athens, 2013, 
p.170. Andrew Crabtree, 'The Deep Roots of Nightmares', in Cultures and Disasters: 
Understanding Cultural Framings in Disaster Risk Reduction, Fred Krüger, Greg Bankoff, Terry 
Cannon, Lisa Schipper, Benedikt Orlowski (eds.), Routledge, New York, 2015. Chester Hartman 
and Gregory Squires, 'Pre-Katrina, Post-Katrina', in There is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster: 
Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina, Chester Hartman and Gregory D. Squires (eds.), Routledge, 
New York, 2006. 
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explained that they did not want to evacuate as to do so involved carrying their 
property out in the open, thereby ‘exposing their wealth (loufu).’ The official who 
reported this behaviour attributed it to ‘bad elements (huai fenzi)’ in the village, who 
had spread rumours that the government was planning to use the flood as an excuse to 
further collectivise property.62 Villagers had good reason to be cautious, given the 
extent to which property had been dispossessed and redistributed by the state in recent 
years. Their fears were in fact quite prescient. Over the next few years the state really 
did appropriate their property and force them to live in communes.  
 
    Another cadre reported how the class taxonomy introduced by the CCP was 
influencing refugee behaviour. Those considered middle or rich peasants did not want 
to be relocated, as they believed that the government would only provide relief to 
those designated as poor peasants. 63 This, again, was not unreasonable, given the 
extent to which those with unfavourable class designations had been excluded from 
earlier government policies.64 The situation was even worse for the most hated class 
enemy, the landlords, who were so convinced that no relief would be forthcoming that 
they simply ‘surrendered to fate (tingtian youming).’ Cadres conducted a propaganda 
campaign designed to allay such ‘ideological concerns (sixiang gulu).’ This could 
hardly undo the insecurity fostered by years of political campaigns. 
 
    When officials attempted to evacuate a village in Qianjiang the local population 
shouted abuse at them. Elsewhere the army resorted to firing guns and artillery into 
the waste ground surrounding a village, and shouting the names of well-known 
‘bandits’ in an attempt to intimidate people into departing.65 Even when villagers 
could be persuaded to leave, the government struggled to maintain order. Cadres in 
Jianli attempted to follow an efficient methodology in which those with poorly 
constructed homes in low-standing areas were to be moved first. Priority would be 
given to the elderly and infirm, and to the families of soldiers.66 Before they could 
implement this methodology, however, local villagers began fighting in order to board 
boats, causing people to drop salvaged property into the water.67 
 
    The problems did not end with evacuation. Host communities often proved less 
than welcoming to members of the displaced population.68 Reluctance to house 
refugees is hardly unusual during a crisis.69 Once again, however, local attitudes were 
informed by the political context. Cadres in Honghu worried that refugees would 
diminish production levels, and villagers feared that an influx of outsiders would 
spark a second wave of land reform. One reasoned that, ‘It is OK for refugees to come, 
but I don’t have much land, I cannot give any away.’70 Citizens of Wuhan also 
grumbled about refugees, complaining that were not working hard enough.71 If these 
urbanites failed to appreciate the sacrifice made by their rural compatriots, it was 
hardly their own fault. Contemporary media reports said nothing of the great misery 	
62 ‘7 Yue xiaxun kuikou fenhong diqu qingkuang,’ HFKDX, pp. 239-240 
63 ‘Kuikou fenhong qu mei ri qingkuang, Hubei sheng shengchan jiuji weiyuanhui bangongshi, 29 
July 1954, HFKDX, p. 245 
64 See for example Li Huaiyin, Village China, p. 29 
65 Feng Zhiqiang, 'Wo jiyi zhong de Jingjiang fenhong gongcheng shouci yunyong, Wuhan wenshi 
ziliao, 7 (2010). 
66 ‘7 Yue xiaxun kuikou fenhong diqu qingkuang’, pp. 239-40 
67 ‘Kuikou fenhong qu mei ri qingkuang,’ p. 261 
68 ‘Jianli jiangnan zaimin gongzuo baogao,’ HFKDX, p. 353. 
69 See for example Edgerton-Tarpley, 'Between War and Water,’ p. 107.  
70 ‘Kuikou fenhong qu mei ri qingkuang,’ pp. 274-5 
71 ‘Wuhan fangxun zhihuibu.’ 
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caused by the drowning the countryside, choosing instead to focus upon the 
miraculous defence of Wuhan. Here, too, the official story was not all that it appeared.    
 
Unsinkable Wuhan 
 
The defence of Wuhan was heralded as the crowning achievement of the flood 
prevention campaign. In 1955 the Hubei Water Conservancy Bureau published a 
commemorative volume entitled The Party Leads the People to Victory over the 
Flood (Dang lingdao renmin zhanshengle hongshui).72 This hagiographic account 
was designed not only to celebrate the successful flood prevention campaign, but also 
to contrast CCP disaster management with supposed inefficiency and corruption of 
the Nationalist regime. Photographs of dry and orderly city streets taken in Wuhan in 
1954 were juxtaposed against chaotic scenes of inundation in the city in 1931. The 
volume also included a cartoon depicting a mother fish talking with her spawn against 
the backdrop of Hankou’s distinctive skyline. In the caption below a young fish asks 
why he cannot visit one of Wuhan’s leading attractions: “Mummy, didn’t you say that 
when the water rose you would take us to Hankou’s Minzhong Amusement Arcade?” 
The mother fish replies; “Child, visiting Minzhong was something I did in 1931, that 
couldn’t happen now.” The message was unequivocal - to the dismay of the local fish 
population, urban flooding was a thing of the past. 
 
Figure 273 
 	
72 ‘Wuhan shi fangxun zong zhihuibu.’ Dang lingdao renmin. 
73 Ibid. 
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    By comparing 1931 and 1954, propagandists were able to construct a narrative that 
adhered to what the literary historian Gang Yue has described as the ‘bitter/sweet 
dichotomy that organized the revolutionary teleology.’74 The successful defence of 
Wuhan was not simply a victory over water but also a victory over history. This 
politicised reading of the disaster was reproduced in the English-language book Man 
Against Flood, written by the New Zealand expatriate Rewi Alley, a leading foreign 
spokesperson for the Maoist regime. Alley was well placed to make a comparison, 
having visited Wuhan during both floods. He claimed that in 1931 the Nationalist 
regime was ‘so wildly corrupt it permitted graft, speculation and stupid inefficiency to 
go hand in hand with relief measures.’75 In 1954, by contrast, ‘the people of Wuhan 
worked a miracle,’ protecting a key industrial centre from inundation. 76 It is difficult 
to determine whether Alley was being deliberately mendacious or whether he had 
been duped by a carefully stage-managed tour of Wuhan.77 Whichever was the case, 
the heroic victory he described stretched the truth to breaking point. 
 
    The modern city of Wuhan comprises the three historic municipalities of Wuchang, 
Hankou and Hanyang. Although the former two areas had genuinely been protected 
from inundation, Hanyang suffered several months of serious flooding and a major 
refugee crisis. The problem was due in a large part to inadequate flood defences. 
Unlike Hankou and Wuchang, which boasted dykes reinforced with concrete, 
Hanyang still relied upon defences constructed from tamped earth, clay, and coal 
slag.78 These crumbling structures were inadequate protection against the oncoming 
deluge. By July, the 7,751 workers who had been sent to bolster the city’s defences 
had run out of earth. Soon a number of key dyke sections began to collapse. In 
desperation, engineers directed workers to protect key industrial sites, including a 
lumberyard and cotton mill. 79  In doing so, they effectively surrendered vast swathes 
of residential housing to water. The inundation of Hanyang mirrored the broader 
dynamic unfolding throughout Hubei. The homes of workers were sacrificed so that 
their factories might survive. Around 26,300 Hanyang residents became refugees as a 
result.80 
 
    In spite of claims that the revolution had improved the lives of the ordinary 
population, many citizens of Hanyang still lived in intense poverty. Older residents 
still recall the simple huts (pengzi) constructed from reeds and other inexpensive 
materials that were erected on lakeshores and riverbanks in the city. These were 
acutely vulnerable to inundation. One family that moved from the rural hinterland to 
work as porters, were living in a riverside area at the time of the flood. When large 
waves began threatening the Dragon Lantern Dyke that protected their neighbourhood, 
they were forced to gather their possessions and flee to Turtle Hill. Here they built a 
small shelter on the former cremation grounds of a local Buddhist monastery. They 
lived for months amidst the charred remains of monks. Similar camps mushroomed 
up on the hillsides, dyke tops, and other areas of high ground, which had formed an 
archipelago of flood islands throughout Hanyang. One interviewee recalled how 
residents of Parrot Island, a fluvial deposit located in the river between the Wuhan 	
74 Gang Yue, The Mouth That Begs: Hunger, Cannibalism, and the Politics of Eating in Modern 
China, Duke University Press, Durham NC, 1999, p. 168. 
75 Alley, Man Against Flood, p. 11. 
76 Ibid, p. 20 
77 On Alley see Brady, Friend of China. 
78 Tao, 'Tao Shuzeng yu 1954 nian.’ 
79 ‘Wuhan fangxun zhihuibu.’ 
80 ‘Kuikou fenhong qu mei ri qingkuang.’ 
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cities, were forced to crush into the classrooms of a local school, living there for 
months. The experiences of these people are missing from both contemporary media 
reports and subsequent histories, which focus upon Hankou and Wuchang and ignore 
the large sections of Wuhan lost to water. 
 
    This was not the first refugee crisis in Hanyang. During the late-imperial period, 
those displaced by disasters had relied upon government granaries and charitable 
organisations, including guilds, benevolent halls, temples, and native place 
associations.81 In the early twentieth century these traditional organisations had been 
augmented by the growth of influential national and international charities. 82 Unlike 
the Nationalists, who had sought to co-opt the expertise and resources of both 
traditional and modern institutions, the CCP took a decidedly dim view of private 
charity, seeing it as a bourgeois obfuscation - a mere palliative for the class 
exploitation that was the root cause of disasters. Undermining private philanthropy 
formed part of the broader attack upon traditional sources of elite legitimacy, which 
had begun in earnest with the Five Antis campaign.83 The 1954 flood represented one 
of the first real challenges for the economic infrastructure that the CCP had 
introduced in order to replace traditional charitable institutions. 
 
    The Nationalists had funded the 1931 flood relief effort with hastily issued bonds 
and costly foreign loans. 84 The CCP was much better placed, being able to utilise a 
fully nationalised banking sector. The People’s Bank of China provided a 300,000 
RMB emergency loan to Wuhan alone.85 The government also initiated large-scale 
interregional grain transfers, a policy which echoed that economic interventions made 
by the Qing state during the eighteenth century golden age of disaster governance.86 
Soon emergency aid was arriving in Hubei from as far afield as Guangdong, Henan 
and Sichuan.87 The state grain monopoly may not have been universally popular, and 
its abuse at the end of the 1950s would be a major cause of famine, yet at this time of 
crisis it provided an expedient means of organising relief. 
 
    Media reports heralded the disaster relief campaign as an unqualified success. 
Shops laden with food in 1954 were juxtaposed with images of starving refugees in 
1931.88 Although this was clearly a highly partial view of events, those who lived as 
refugees in Hanyang tended to corroborate this positive assessment. The relief effort 
is remembered as a highly organised and well-provisioned affair. ‘Chairman Mao was 
very good,’ one now elderly woman recalled, ‘He didn’t let us starve. Every family 
got steamed bread.' Another former refugee marvelled at how the government had 
used airdrops to feed those isolated on hillsides. The picture may not have been quite 	
81 William Rowe, Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895, Stanford 
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a rosy as these refugees recalled. Cadre reports show that outbreaks of malaria and 
gastrointestinal disease took a heavy toll upon refugees in Hanyang.89 Rather than 
recalling such hardships, memories of the flood tended to be tinged with a degree of 
nostalgia. This is fairly typical, as many older Wuhan residents still view the 
collective era as relatively egalitarian and incorrupt. Yet we cannot simply dismiss 
these positive memories. The near universal praise heaped upon governors in 1954 
suggests that, in Hanyang at least, the disaster was managed relatively well. One 
interviewee even went so far as to suggest that being a refugee was preferable to his 
everyday life at the time. At least in the camp he received a daily ration of food. 
Unfortunately these positive experiences were not shared by many of those living in 
the countryside, where the flood had resulted in widespread hunger and disease.  
 
 
Death in the countryside 
 
The Chinese government has always maintained that the 1954 flood resulted in a 
relatively limited loss of life. Contemporary media reports offered virtually no 
descriptions of death, save for a few accounts of exemplars martyred in the war 
against water. The officially recognised death toll, compiled by State Statistical 
Bureau in the 1990s, puts the figure at 33,160 fatalities throughout China.90 Although 
not an inconsiderable loss, this mortality rate was well below the estimates for the 
1931 flood, when anywhere between 400,000 and 2,000,000 people died. 91 Quite 
how the official death toll for 1954 was calculated remains a mystery. This has not 
stopped the figure from becoming the standard cited by both local and foreign 
historians.92 There is, however, an alternative set of statistics that offer a very 
different picture of the flood. An internal disaster investigation carried out by the CCP 
in early 1955 suggests that 149,507 people died in Hubei alone. 93  The report 
categorises victims in accordance with their cause and place of death, suggesting that 
this investigation had a coherent methodology. These statistics are corroborated by 
another cadre report, which suggests that between July and November 1954 around 
132,221 people had died.94  
 
    These reports demonstrate that around five times as many people died in the flood 
than has been officially acknowledged. Somewhere in the journey between internal 
reports and officially published statistics, the lives of well over 100,000 people simply 
disappeared from history. What truly occurred during the flood is obscured beneath 
layers of euphemism and politicised rhetoric in official reports. The few glimpses that 
are revealed when this veneer slips, coupled with the insights offered by oral history, 
provide valuable clues as to what went wrong. Famine had historically been one of 
the most significant problems facing flood-stricken populations in China. Although 
refugees in Wuhan in 1954 may have marvelled at the generosity of the state, the 
same could not be said for their rural counterparts. One farmer from Shaomaoshan 
remembered receiving very little state assistance. Instead his family fell back upon 	
89 ‘Kuikou fenhong qu mei ri qingkuang,’ p. 264. ‘Wuhan fangxun zhihuibu’ 
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traditional coping strategies, eating unripe rice and beans salvaged from the flood. 
When these stocks ran out they relied upon assistance offered by kinship networks. 
The propaganda celebrating a victory over the flood did not resonate with this 
individual’s experiences. ‘We were very pitiful (zaoye),’ he recalled, ‘I feel very 
miserable thinking about those times.’95 
 
    Not all rural areas suffered such profound privation. Cadres in Huangpi were fêted 
as ‘Buddhas of salvation (jiuming pusa)’ after they distributed food and oil to the 
local population.96 Yet even in areas where the state was able to provide relief, there 
were often still food shortages. Soon rural populations began to display the symptoms 
of acute economic distress.97 Cadres in Honghu bemoaned the fact that refugees had 
spent relief funds on begging bowls, seeing this as an expression of misguided 
ideology rather than desperation.98 The re-emergence of mendicancy was particularly 
galling, as the eradication of begging had been one of the most celebrated victories of 
the early CCP government.99 Elsewhere farmers sold their cattle, a desperate act given 
the vital role these animals played in the pre-mechanised agricultural system. Many 
people went to great lengths to save their oxen and buffalo from drowning, only to 
find they had no fodder to feed them. By the autumn, cadres were reporting that ‘evil 
merchants’ were travelling from Hunan to purchase cattle at minimal prices.100 Asset 
speculation had been a mainstay of Chinese disasters for centuries.101 It would seem 
that even after the Five Antis campagin, this rapacious form of economic exploitation 
was still thriving.  
 
    In spite of the obvious distress caused by the destruction of the main summer 
harvest, there is little evidence to suggest that Hubei sank into a full-blown famine in 
1954. The disaster investigation suggested that a mere 69 people had died as the result 
of exposure and starvation. 102  Rural communities may have been begging and 
divesting assets, but they do not appear to have been selling family members, and 
they certainly did not engage in cannibalism, as famished people sometimes had in 
the past and would again at the end of the 1950s.103 The official relief campaign no 
doubt played a role in preventing starvation. Yet people from Hubei were formidable 
flood survivalists. Cadres praised the autonomous actions of farmers, who began to 
plant and even clear new land at the height of the flood.104 When the water receded, 
people used buckets to catch the fish stranded in pools. Counterintuitive as it may 
seem, some interviewees actually remembered the flood as a time of plenty due to this 
nutritional windfall. 
 
	
95 In the Hubei dialect zaoye 造业 (a variant of the Buddhist karmic concept zaonie 遭孽) is used in 
a similar way to the term kelian可怜 in standard Mandarin. 
96 ‘Hubei sheng zaiqing jianbao’ 7 July 1954, HFKDX, pp. 228-9 
97 ‘7 Yue xiaxun kuikou fenhong diqu qingkuang.’  
98 ‘Kuikou fenhong qu mei ri qingkuang.’ 
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100 ‘7 Yue xiaxun kuikou fenhong diqu qingkuang.’ 
101 On disaster profiteering in the eighteenth century see Pierre-Étienne Will, Bureaucracy and 
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1990.   
102 Hubei sheng yijiuwusi nian shuizai qingkuang ji zaihou huifu qingkuang tongji, Hubei sheng 
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    When it comes to famine, absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of 
absence. It is possible that investigators may have chosen for political reasons to 
attribute starvation fatalities to disease. During the Great Leap, famine was sometimes 
described as medical emergency to render it more politically palatable.105 It is also 
possible that some people did not have time to starve to death, as they succumbed to 
infections first. Throughout history, disease has always been the leading proximate 
cause of flood mortality, far outstripping the threat from drowning or starvation. 1954 
was no exception. Most of those who died succumbed to disease. Dysentery, 
gastroenteritis and other diarrheal conditions accounted for almost two thirds of all 
disease fatalities.106 Contagious diseases such as measles and influenza were the 
second most lethal. Malaria, which ordinarily thrived during Yangzi floods, accounted 
for a mere five per cent.107 In the aftermath of inundation, haemorrhagic fever and 
schistosomiasis swept through a weakened population, helping to raise death rates to 
fifteen per thousand.108  
 
Prefecture (qu) Flood-Affected Population Mortality 
Huanggang 2,6060,130 11,260 
Xiaogan 2,435,999 31,699 
Jingzhou 3,873,335 104,598 
Yichang 248,957 829 
Xianyang 598,814 889 
Enshi 108,629 107 
Huangshi City 32,937 125 
Figure 3109 
 
    Of the approximately 10,000,000 people in Hubei affected by the disaster, by far 
the largest proportion could be found in Jingzhou, the prefecture were flood diversion 
was located. This area not only had the largest aggregate population of refugees but 
also by far the highest per capita mortality (see Figure 2). It was home to around forty 
per cent of flood victims yet suffered almost seventy per cent of all fatalities. We are 
unlikely to ever know the truth about what went wrong in this prefecture. From the 
internal report we learn that the three most severely affected counties were Mianyang 
(25,702 fatalities), Jianli (32,627), and Honghu (21,092). Other areas suffered from 
mountain flooding, waterlogging or dyke failure, yet it was the three counties that the 
government flooded deliberately that had by far the highest rate of mortality. 
 	
105 Compare Paltemaa, Managing Famine, Flood, and Earthquake in China, p. 33. 
106 Statistics based on a study of 7898 deceased people from 8 counties. ‘Zaiqu qingkuang jianbao,’ 
p. 280 
107 22.8 per cent of deaths were attributed to ‘other’ causes. 
108 Tao Jingliang, 'The Features of the Three Gorges Dam', in Megaproject: A Case Study of 
China's Three Gorges Dam, Shui-Hung Luk and Joseph Whitney (eds.), M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 
1993. 
109 Compiled using data from Hubei sheng yijiuwusi nian shuizai qingkuang, 
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    The government cannot be held entirely responsible for these fatalities. Even had 
they not opened the sluice gates then it is estimated that around seventy per cent of 
this region would have been inundated.110 The diseases that drove mortality were 
density sensitive, meaning that the per capita mortality rate was bound to by highest 
in the area with the largest concentration of refugees. Yet there were clearly some 
woeful inadequacies in disaster management in Jingzhou, which helped to create 
beneficial ecological conditions for the types of pathogens that cause gastrointestinal 
disease. One report from Honghu described how displaced people were defecating 
and urinating freely around their living area. Cadres sought to shift the blame onto 
refugees, claiming they lacked adequate hygienic education. Arguably, however, the 
fact that refugees had not been provided with even the most basic facilities is a bitter 
indictment of disaster governance. 111  Propagandists heaped praise upon the 
population of the flood diversion zone for sacrificing their homes. In reality rural 
refugees were abandoned to live in abject conditions. Given that this was a planned 
flood, the failure to evacuate and rehouse refugees is quite incomprehensible. 
Governors concentrated upon elaborate technical interventions and yet did not plan 
for the humanitarian consequences of the flood diversion 
 
    This neglect continued in the months following the flood. According to 
contemporary propaganda, by saving Wuhan the government had retained the 
economic and infrastructural capacity to reconstruct the whole province.112 In contrast 
to this positive picture, refugees from Hanyang remembered reconstruction as an 
arduous and unpleasant process. They had to return to live in homes that were coated 
in thick layers of malodourous mud. In the countryside things were even worse. One 
interviewee described returning to his farm to find all his crops washed away and his 
draught animals dead. His family then had to live with little food through a bitterly 
cold winter in a hastily improvised shack. He was luckier than many of his neighbours, 
who had been killed in the flood. The bitter reality of post-disaster life perhaps goes 
some way to explaining why an epidemic of suicide began to sweep through Hubei. 
Once again residents of the flood diversion zone were the hardest hit. Of the 2,010 
people who took their own lives during the disaster in Hubei, some 1,349 were from 
this area.113 These desperate people, whose communities and systems of subsistence 
had been sacrificed to save other areas, faced a future of economic hardship and acute 
insecurity. Those who chose to take their own lives were the last unacknowledged 
casualties of the war against water. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The 1954 flood laid bare a brutal irony of the Chinese revolution - a political project 
that had swept to power by mobilising millions of rural citizens chose repeatedly to 
sacrifice the countryside in order to develop the city. Some of the communities that 
were flooded deliberately had supported the CCP loyally since as early as the 1920s, 
providing assistance to guerrilla forces fighting against the Nationalists and 
Japanese.114 One was so renowned that it was celebrated in the 1961 motion picture 	
110 ‘Hubei sheng zaiqing jiankuang,’ 6 September 1954, HFKDX p. 226. 
111 ‘Kuikou fenhong qu mei ri qingkuang,’ p. 263. 
112 Alley, Man Against Flood, p. 20 
113 Hubei sheng yijiuwusi nian shuizai qingkuang. It is also possible that ‘suicide’ was used in the 
statistics as a euphemism for deaths of a politically sensitive nature.   
114 Gregor Benton, New Fourth Army: Communist Resistance Along the Yangtze and the Huai, 
1938-1941, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1999, p. 38. 
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The Red Guards on Honghu Lake (Honghu chiwei dui).115 This loyalty counted for 
very little as the sluice gates were opened. This deliberate flooding was an extreme 
example of the kind of urban bias that Jeremy Brown has described as typical for the 
Maoist era. Policies that aimed ostensibly to eliminate distinctions between the 
countryside and the city actually sharpened the divide. This was most evident during 
the Great Leap famine, yet could also be discerned when millions of urban youths 
were dumped on the countryside during the Cultural Revolution.116 
 
    The Maoist state is not the only polity in history to have sacrificed rural lives to 
rivers. The most obvious comparison is with the Nationalists, whose generals 
deliberately breached the Yellow River dykes in 1938 in a desperate attempt to slow 
the Japanese advance. 117 Qing commanders adopted a similar approach in 1856, 
albeit on a smaller scale, using the Juzhang River as a weapon against their Taiping 
enemies.118 Looking beyond China, the United States Army Corps of Engineers blew 
up levees in 1927, unleashing the Mississippi onto rural districts in order to protect 
New Orleans.119 The 1954 flood diversion was not, then, a peculiar pathology of 
Maoist ideology. Neither was it morally indefensible. Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley has 
described the Nationalist decision to unleash the Yellow River as a ‘pragmatic 
response to a terrible situation.’120 The same could be said of 1954. We need look no 
further than 1931 to see how much more profound the humanitarian consequences 
could have been had the whole of Wuhan been inundated. Not only would millions of 
urban citizens have been plunged into water, the province would also have been 
deprived of its economic centre. Those who opened the sluice gates were neither 
heroes nor villains. In as much as their decision has been distorted terribly within 
hagiographic official histories of the flood, it cannot be explained by the form of 
demonographic analysis that is sometimes deployed within the popular historiography 
of Maoist China. This was a complex zero-sum calculation, which belies attempts to 
transform history into a political cautionary tale. 
 
    Hubei would have flooded in 1954 no matter which political party was at the helm. 
Whether the humanitarian consequences would have been the same is a different 
question. The CCP seems to have managed some aspects of the relief effort relatively 
well, taking advantage of increased control over labour, finances, and grain. Contrary 
to the view of historians who feel we must apply a totalising logic when analysing the 
Maoist economic system, the experience of the 1950s reveals that the collective 
economy was good at some things and bad at others. One area where it seemed to 
thrive was in distributing resources during relief campaigns. The generally positive 
memories of refugees in Hanyang were hardly exceptional. Members of communities 
that experienced the Wei River Floods in Henan in 1956 and the Hai River Floods in 
Hebei in 1963 also spoke highly of government relief efforts. 121  This relative 	
115 See Hong hu chi wei dui : ge ju, Renmin wenxue chubanshe, Beijing, 1978. 
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efficiency renders the mass starvation of the late-1950s even more incomprehensible. 
During these so-called Three Years of Natural Disasters, a government that had learnt 
to deal relatively effectively with acute subsistence crises fell back on the oldest 
excuse in the book – blaming their economic mismanagement upon the weather. 
 
    If the state was able to organise effective relief then why did so many people perish 
in Hubei in 1954? The answers are more political than economic. They involved both 
the micropolitics of the village, where distrustful farmers felt that they were being 
duped out of land, and the macropolitics of hydraulic governance, with engineers 
giving insufficient thought to the collateral damage caused by hydraulic interventions. 
Each of these spheres speaks to a political system that, as Yang Jisheng has argued, 
lacked an effective feedback mechanism between society and state.122 This also 
ensured that none of the lessons of the flood were enshrined within disaster 
governance. Rather than subjecting itself to the kind of rigorous self-criticism (ziwo 
pipan) that it so often prescribed to political opponents, the party-state instead rewrote 
the history of the flood. This not only expunged thousands of lives from the record, 
but also precluded any chance that the flood might inspire the kind of ‘fundamental 
learning’ that Christian Pfister has identified as key to addressing the ultimate causes 
of disasters.123As a result, rather than seeking to respect and accommodate inevitable 
hydrological fluctuations, the government continued to do battle with the Yangzi. 
This culminated with the construction of the Three Gorges Dam. When this was 
completed in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the government seemed to 
have finally solved the problem of flooding in Hubei.124 The millions displaced by 
this monumental engineering scheme were, it would seem, a price worth paying for 
hydraulic security.125 Unfortunately, the declaration of victory in the war against 
water proved premature. During the summer of 2016 much of Hubei, including 
Wuhan, found itself once again under water. It would seem that residents of this long 
disaster-prone province are condemned to suffer flooding every time the Yangzi 
forgets that it has been vanquished.  
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